René Descartes employs the term "fable" or "fabula" in numerous instances throughout his work, yet he never provides an explicit account of his understanding of the term. In my paper, I aim to establish an understanding of this usage in relation to the overarching theme of framing narratives. I highlight that, despite Descartes's texts generally being decisively non-narrative and characterised by systematic and methodological approaches, their very nature depends on autobiographical, exemplary, and even "fabulistic" moments. These moments are inscribed in the text yet only brought forth as means to an end that Descartes envisions for his philosophical prose. Applying our terminology to this corpus allows us to observe that when it is a narrative that does the framing, the framed need not necessarily be narrative as well. On the contrary, the outer or earlier stage of Descartes's progression towards a binding and irrefutable philosophical method of thought is presented as a necessary, albeit negligible, detour towards the deeper insights of his work. Descartes regards his "fables" as narrative tools that are only temporary components of his textual compositions. Once they have fulfilled their purpose, there will be no further need for moral advice, good examples, or biographical identification. When – according to Jean-Luc Nancy – Mundus est Fabula is an apt summary of Descartes's so-called "methodological doubt", this maxim applies only until further notice; with regard to their temporal structure, the global fables of Descartes's world are written to be outlived by their 'morals' – the overarching way towards knowledge of his future "method".